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Traceability, Liability and Incentives for Food Safety and Quality
Recent food safety concerns and well-publicized food scares have heightened awareness 
of traceability in the food supply chain.  When the first U.S. case of Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow disease”) was discovered in Washington State,
federal authorities suggested that “it might take weeks, even months, to track the origins 
of the diseased cow” (Clemetson and Simon, p.1).  With the cooperation of herd owners, 
livestock dealers and market operators as well as detailed record searches between United 
States and Canadian agencies, the authorities were able to trace the origin of the affected 
cow to Canada only after a week, but herd mates were never fully traced.
The December 2003 case of BSE in Washington State highlighted the demand for 
traceability to regain consumer confidence after the discovery of a first event. In addition, 
in the case of highly contagious disease or when multiple related dangers are suspected, 
traceability is important to reduce risk of further damage.
Traceability of food products back to the farm of origin may be motivated by 
many considerations in addition to consumer confidence and reducing effects of 
contagious disease.  These include to : a) protect the general reputation of firms, an  
industry or a country; b) differentiate products by suppliers who provide traceability; c) 
guarantee product origin when origin is an attribute of interest to consumers or others; d) 
improve supply management by firms; e) monitor and assure production or processing 
methods; f) erect implicit international trade restrictions.  Another motivation, the focus 
of this paper, is to provide information about suppliers that allows application of liability 
for food safety or other product quality problems.2
Food traceability has received growing recognition in the economic literature. 
For example in their recent ERS report, Golan et al. (2004) discuss traceability as a 
solution to selected market failures.  They describe the development of traceability 
systems in three food sectors: fresh produce, grains and oilseeds and cattle and beef. 
Dickinson and Bailey and Hobbs et al. estimated the willingness to pay for traceability 
using laboratory auction markets. They both find that consumers are willing to pay a 
small premium for traceability. 
Hobbs, Golan et al.(2003) and Meuwissen et al. link food traceability to product 
liability. For Hobbs, one role of traceability systems is to provide ex post information that 
allows liability.  She notes that traceability increases firms’ incentives to provide safer 
food. Golan et al. (2003) also recognize that traceability can help to establish the extent 
of liability of a firm and potentially shift liability to others.  Finally, liability is 
recognized as one item on the economic research agenda on traceability identified by 
Meuwissen et al.
In this paper we focus specifically on the implications for additional traceability 
in the context of liability for food safety problems.  We model formally the linkage 
between traceability and food safety and establish the implications of an increase in 
traceability-liability for food safety and related economic outcomes. The capacity to trace 
the origin of food increases the possibility of legal remedy and compensation in case of 
food safety event. Traceability also allows parties to more easily document that they are 
not responsible for harm.  Therefore, traceability systems create incentives for firms to 
supply safer food.  Our formal model traces the linkage between traceability, liability and 
food safety incentives by farms and marketing firms.3
A large body of literature compares the effectiveness of liability relative to 
regulation in maximizing social welfare (e.g.  Shavell (1984); Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson; 
Hiriart, Martimort and Pouyet; Roe; and Boyer and Porrini).  Companion work has begun 
to explore liability relative to regulation in the context of food safety and traceability 
using modeling approaches similar to those employed here.  In this paper, we focus 
specifically on how private or market traceability enhancements affect food safety.
Cost of Foodborne Illness and Liability
Foodborne illnesses have important economics impacts. The ERS estimated that the 
annual medical cost, productivity losses, and costs of premature deaths due to seven 
major foodborne pathogens range between $6.6 and $37.1 billion in 1996 dollars (Buzby 
and Roberts).  The total societal costs of foodborne illnesses are certainly higher as the 
ERS did not take into account the cost of pain and suffering and did not consider other 
type of pathogens.  The implication is that there is considerable scope for potential 
liability if even a small share of those costs of foodborne illnesses could be traced back to 
their original and if those responsible could be held liable.
In fact, liability has been difficult to establish for food products. First, it is hard to 
link foodborne illness to a specific product as there is rarely a sample of suspect food to 
test for contamination. Recently, an increase in the number of illnesses that require 
mandatory reporting to public health officials and an increase in the sophistication of 
public health investigators has reduced the magnitude of this obstacle (Clark). Second, 
even though the contaminated product is identified, it might be difficult to discover its 
origin. The lack of traceability is not a problem only for consumers, but also for food 4
marketers in the supply chain as they are not able to transfer liability to their supplier.
Vertically integrated firms may not be able to use the proximate cause defence because 
they are responsible for more stages of the production process.
1
The difficulty to link foodborne illness to a specific food product and to trace its 
origin leads to a very low number of cases being brought to court.  A conservative 
estimate of the litigation rate for all food poisoning cases is 0.09 to 0.45 legal cases per 
100,000 illnesses (Buzby and Frenzen).  Viscusi calculates that 95% of the product 
liability claims (for all products not just food) that are not dropped before going to court 
are finally solved by an out-of-court settlement. He also estimates that When a case does 
go to court, the plaintiff success rate in court is 37%.  Buzby, Frenzen and Rasco study 
the use of product liability law for injuries attributed to microbially contaminated foods. 
Using a sample of 175 foodborne illness lawsuits resolved in court from 1987-97, the 
authors examine the incentive to provide safe food under the threat of lawsuits by 
consumers in case of food safety problems.
2 They found that 31.4% of the cases resulted 
in some compensation paid by the firms to the consumers. When the plaintiff was 
favoured, the compensations awarded range from $2,256 to $2,368,858 with a median of 
$25,560 (1998 dollars). In 92 cases, no pathogen, toxins or illnesses were identified. 
Salmonella was the most commonly identified pathogen with 39 cases. When the 
plaintiffs identified a specific pathogen, she was favoured in almost 42% of the times. 
                                                
1 There are two types of causation in law: cause-in-fact and proximate cause. Cause-in-fact is determined 
using the “but-for” test. The plaintiff must prove that in the absence of an action by the injurer, there would 
have been no harm. In proximate cause, the foreseeability of an event determines the scope of liability. The 
court must determine if the harm resulting from an action was reasonably predictable (Golan et al. (2004)).
2 The number of cases considered by Buzby, Frenzen and Rasco is small compared to the 200 cases that 
attorney Bruce Clark claimed that he has personally been involved over a six years period. The website of 
Marler Clark gives a list of legal cases related to foodborne illnesses that have been resolved.5
The actual compensation allocated in food safety litigation is non-negligible. For 
example, Clark claims that he has been involved in claims that account for a total of 200 
millions dollars in a period of six years.  However, the importance of the cost of 
foodborne illness stresses how traceability, by making liability more feasible, could lead 
to large transfer of compensation to consumers and create significant incentives for firms 
and farms to supply safer food, thus reducing the societal costs of foodborne illnesses.
The model
In this section, we lay out definitions and specifications of our model.  Results are 
derived in the following section.
Golan et al. (2003) define traceability as “recordkeeping systems designed to 
track the flow of product or product attributes through the production process or supply 
chain”.  For the purpose of this paper, this definition is sufficient.  We simply define 
traceability as the ability to trace the history of a product along a supply chain.  
Strict liability is the applicable legal rule in the food industry in the U.S. (Clark).
Strict liability means that the seller of a product that causes injury to a consumer may be 
legally responsible even in the absence of ex ante knowledge by the seller of the product's 
hazard (Cooter).
Unlike earlier articles in the product liability literature, which assume only one 
step in the supply chain and costless traceability, we model a supply chain comprised of
consumers, marketers (any firms provide services between farmers and consumers) and
farmers (raw material producers).
3  Further, we allow for market power by marketers in 
                                                
3 For a review of the literature on economic theory of liability, see Cooter, Polinsky and Shavell or Shavell 
(2006).6
buying from farmers and in selling to the consumers. For generality, we also allow for 
market power by farmers in selling raw material for consumer food products.  Consumers 
have no market power.  The source of food safety problems can be either the marketers or 
the farmers.
We assume that the level of contamination (which increases the probability of a 
food safety problem or negative event) is a decreasing function of the effort, or level of 
care, exerted by marketers and farmers.  This allows us to write the probability of a 
negative food safety event as a function of the efforts to supply safe food by the 
marketers and the farmers.  Let  m e  and  f e be the efforts to provide safe food by the 
marketers and the farmers. Denote by    , m f P P e e   the probability of a food safety 
event.  
For simplicity and ease of exposition, we assume that marketers’ and producers’ 
efforts to control contamination are independent, i.e. 
2 2
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m f f m
P P
e e e e
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.  We write the 
probability of a food safety event as      m m f f P g e g e   .  This assumption contrasts 
with the seminal work of Brown and the recent elaborated version of Brown’s model by 
Roe.  These authors examine only one type of firm but assume that consumers and 
suppliers each are sources of product safety problems.  They assume that there are no 
independent sources of liability so that any negative act by the supplier may be offset by 
a positive act by the consumer and vice versa. 7







































That is, the probabilities of an event decrease at a decreasing rate with the level of care 
and the marginal effect of additional effort decreases with respect to effort.
The independence of the effect of efforts on the probability of an event simplifies 
the analysis but is a limitation.  To see this, consider the following example. Imagine that 
a farmer applied pesticides late such that there is pesticide residue on fruit when 
harvested.  The marketer is aware of this possibility and has the capacity to wash the fruit 
but neglects to do so.  If a consumer is sick after eating some fruit, the marketer is liable 
for the event.  In that case, traceability to the farm would imply no additional liability 
burden for the farmers for food safety events occurring at the consumer level.  However, 
when the probabilities are independent, the marketer can transfer liability to the farm if it 
is possible to trace the food item to the farm and to link the specific source of 
contamination to the farmers rather than the marketer.  If the probability were not 
independent, we would need to specify rules for sharing liability.
In our model as in reality, traceability is imperfect such that it is not always 
possible to identify the source of the contamination.  We measure the level of traceability 
as the probability to trace back the source of contamination.  Let   0,1 m T   be the level
of traceability at the marketer level and let    0,1 f T   be the level of traceability from the 
marketers to the farms.
4  Thus, the probability that a product is traceable to the farm is 
m f T T .
                                                
4 In practice, even if no traceability technology is in place, minimum positive levels of traceability may 
exist.  We simplify by normalizing this minimum level of traceability to zero.8
We assume that full compensation is available when the source of contamination 
is identified.  We do not consider cases where the firms are not able to compensate the 
consumers in case of an event.
5  We may consider that, as in reality, marketers and 
farmers contract liability insurance.  The insurer provides legal defence and pays for the 
damages.  We suppose that insurance is provided at a fair price and that the insurer 
knows the risk from marketers and farmers activities.  












 the average probability of a food safety event at the consumer level.  
We assume that the consumers observe only the average level of safety supplied by the 
marketers, that is consumers are not able to differentiate the food safety attributes of 
different firms.  Therefore, we define    1 m E T PA    as the expected consumer loss in 
welfare from the consumption of a unit of food.  Only traceability to the marketers 
matters to consumer because any possible compensation would be paid to consumers by 
the marketers.  We suppose a linear demand function in which the expected consumer 
loss in welfare decreases the consumer willingness to pay for food. The inverse demand 
function is denoted by    , q E q E     , where   is the price and q is the 
consumption quantity and  scales the intercept.
6
                                                
5 Shavell (1984) studies the effect of inefficiencies such as the possibility that parties would not be able to 
pay fully for harm done or the event does not result in a legal judgement.
6 In an earlier version of this paper we derive this linear demand assuming that safety is a vertically 
differentiated characteristic using a model similar as Tirole p. 96.  These details do not add to the results 
and complicate the notation.9
We suppose Cournot conjectures in the marketing sector.  Each of the identical M
marketers have an output x such that M x = q.  The expected profit function of each 
marketer is
          , , 1 ; m m m m m m m f f f q E x x c x e xT g e A xT T g e A         
where   is the price paid to farmers in terms of marketers’ output and   is a parameter 
converting the marketers’ units of input in terms of output.  For simplicity we assume 
that 1   .  We denote production cost by   , m m c x e .  To obtain analytical results and 
focus on traceability instead of technology, we assume that the marginal cost of 
production is constant with respect to the output but increases with the level of effort 
exerted to producer safer food,      , m m m c x e x e   , where    m e   is an increasing 
function.  For simplicity, we assume that traceability itself is costless and we shift the 
quantity of traceability rather than the cost of traceability.  This assumption does not have 
any consequence on the effort exerted by marketers and farmers.
The total cost of insurance at a fair price for marketers to cover potential liability 
costs is        1 m m m m f f f xT g e A xT T g e A   .  The first term in this expression, 
  m m m xT g e A, is the expected liability cost for damages that are due to marketer 
practices.  The second term in the expression,      1 m f f f xT T g e A  , is the expected 
liability cost due to farmers activities.  Because the marketers cannot use the proximate 
cause defense, they are liable for any damages due either to their own activities or the 
activities of  the farmers from whom they buy raw materials.  When an event can be 
traced to the farm, the marketers can transfer the liability cost to the farmers.  As with 10
consumers, the marketers observe the average safety of raw material supplied in the farm 
industry and not the level of safety supplied by each farmer.  
The farm sector is characterized by N farmers competing in output y.  Again, for 
notation simplicity we suppose that the farms are identical.  For each farmer the expected 
profit function is  
      , , f f f f m f f f N y e y c y e yT T g e A      ;
where    , f N y e   is the marketers’ inverse demand function. We assume that the farmers 
use a production technology similar to the marketers
    , f f f c y e y e   ;
where    f e   is an increasing function.  The expected liability costs of a farmer is 
  m f f f yT T g e A, the total liability costs that are transfer from the marketers.
Effects of traceability on food safety
In this section we analyze how degree or level of traceability and the number of 
marketing firms and farms influence the supply food safety.  Our model recognizes that 
consumers are willing to pay for traceability for two liability-related reasons.  Recall that 
the expected consumer loss in welfare from the consumption of one unit of food is given 
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.
We refer to the first term,  PA  , as the consumer willingness to pay for traceability as a 
specific attribute as it provides better chances of compensation in the case of a food 11
safety event.  We refer to the second term,   1
f m
m
m m f m
e e P P
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e T e T
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           
, as the 
additional consumer willingness to pay for traceability because they know that with more 
traceability firms and farms are likely to supply safer food.  Because the supply of safer
food has public good characteristics with in the industry, we will see that the free-rider 
problem is imbedded in this second term.
7  Therefore, when the number of firms tends to 
infinity this term collapse to zero.  We can derive similar effects for the price paid to 
farmers by marketers.
As shown in the previous section, the level of food safety supplied by the 
marketers and the farmers is determined by their liability burden and the premium they 
receive from the consumers to supply safer food.  From the first order condition for profit 
maximization, we find that the effort by the marketers is implicitly given by
        1
1
m m m m m
m m
m m m
e g e g e
T A T A
e e M e
   
   
  
. (1)
To find the effort of the farmers, we begin with the aggregate demand function of 
the marketing firms. Taking the first order condition with respect to the output and 
rearranging, we find that the inverse demand function for one representative marketer,
          1 1 m m m f f f m M x g e T T g e A e              .
Solving for the price paid to the farmers, the aggregated inverse demand for the 
marketers may be written in terms of farmers output
         
1
1 m m m f f f m
M




          .
                                                
7 Some industries solve the free-rider problem by regulating the supply of safe food.  For example, Alston 
et al. analyse the collective action in the marketing order in the California pistachio industry.12
Taking the derivatives of the inverse demand function with respect to farmers’ effort, we 
obtain,











.    
The farmers’ first order condition with respect to the effort is
















 and rearranging we obtain that the effort by the farmers is implicitly 
given by
        1
1
f f f f f
f m f m
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T T A T T A
e e N e
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. (2)
In equations (1) and (2), the term on the left-hand-side is the due to the consumers 
and marketers willingness to pay for traceability because it increase their likely 
compensation. The term on the right-hand-side is the effect of the willingness to pay by 
consumers and marketers for traceability because it creates higher incentives to supply 
safe food. Clearly, when the number of marketers in (1) and the number of farmers in (2)
tend to infinity, the free-rider problem make the effect of the premium for safer food tend 
to zero.
 When the number of marketer and farmer is 1, the effect of added traceability 
disappears because traceability is guaranteed.  The same is true when the levels of 
traceability are already equal to 1.  In those two cases the first order condition are






















This is the Pareto optimal solution where the marginal costs of supplying food safety is 
equal to the marginal benefit.
Define    1 m m m S g e    the level of safety supplied by the marketers and by 
  1 f f f S g e    the level of safety supplied by the farmers. To see the impact of 
additional traceability on the supply of food safety, we can take the total derivatives of 
(1) and (2).  Holding the level of traceability to the farm and the size of the damage and 
the number of firms constant, we obtain
     
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. Using the fact that 
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have,
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Traceability to the marketers increases the supply of safer food. We can proceed in the 
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Comparing (3) to (5) and (4) to (6), we see that additional traceability to the 
marketers or to the farms have different impacts on the supply of food safety by the 
farmers.  More traceability to each type of suppliers increases the incentives for farmers 
to supply food safety as both (4) and (6) decrease with respect to traceability. However, 
increasing traceability to the farm decreases the liability burden of marketers for 
contamination originating from the farms, whereas increasing traceability to the 
marketers increases both marketers and farmers liability. An increase in the level of 
traceability to the farm has no effect on the supply of food safety by the marketers 
because it does not create incentives for the marketers to expend additional effort on safer 
food.  This is due to the assumption of independence of the effort of marketers and 15
farmers. That is, the fact that the farmers does not change the supply of safe food by the 
marketers.
Define      1 1 m m f f S P g e g e       the total level of food safety, which is the 
probability that food is safe. We illustrate the total level of food safety using three 
figures.  In Figure 1, we keep the number of farmers constant and look at how the level of 
safety changes with traceability for different number of marketers.  The intercept of every 
curve gives the level of safety when traceability to the marketers is equal to zero. 
Analytically, we can fin this level of safety by setting  0 m T   in (1) and (2).  The level of 
safety is strictly higher with low number of farmers for every level of traceability.  Larger 
is the number of marketers, more important is the free-rider problem and lower is the 
level of safety. However, as the level of traceability approaches one, the free-rider 
problem disappears and the levels of safety are the same almost.  Although this not 
obvious in the figure, the level of safety when  1 m T   differ slightly because the level of 
traceability to the farms is not 1.
In figure 2 we do a similar exercise by keeping the number of marketers is 
constant and looking at how traceability to the farmers influences the level of safety for 
different number of farmers.  The shape of Figure 2 is essentially the same as Figure 1. 
However, the lines are closer as the number of firms is larger and because the level of 
traceability to the farm is relatively high at  0.90 m T  . Figure 3 offers an alternative 3D 
representation of the level of safety in function of traceability to the marketers and to the 
farms.16
Figure 1: Food Safety in Function of the Level of Traceability to the Marketers.
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The dashed line represents the probability of a food safety event when there is only one 
marketer. Similarly, the gray line represents a case where the number of marketers is 
equal to 15 and the black line a case where the number of marketers is equal to 150.  The 
number of farmers is constant and equal to 300. The level of traceability to the farm is 
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Figure 2: Safety in Function of the Level of Traceability to the Farms.
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The dashed line represents the probability of a food safety event when there are 15 
farmers; the gray line represents a case where the number of farmers is equal to 30; and 
the black line a case where the number of marketers is equal to 300.  The number of 
marketers is constant and equal to 300.  The level of traceability to the marketers is equal 































e   .18






















The number of marketers and farmers are constant and respectively equal to 15 and 300. 
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Conclusions
Many issues surround traceability of food products from the consumer through the 
marketing and processing firm and back to the farm of origin.  Traceability may be a 
product attribute demanded by consumers or traceability may be required to document 
some other attribute that consumers value, such as a certain production method.  
Sometimes governments may impose mandatory traceability in order to enhance 
protection from invasive diseases or to facilitate regulation.
This paper is the first to explore in detail the relationships between traceability 
and the provision of food safety when traceability facilitates attributing liability for lapses 
in food safety to individual firms.  The paper develops a formal model of how, by 
facilitating liability, traceability causes the degree of food safety to increase.  We show 
that an increase in the likelihood that a marketing firm or farm will be held liable for 
losses suffered from a food safety event causes them to increase their effort to improve 
the food safety.  We also show that when there is a finite number of firms and farms, the 
improved food safety caused by traceability also increases consumers’ willingness to pay 
for the (safer) product and this creates an additional incentive to improve the food safety 
reputation of the industry.  We show that incentives of this industry reputation effect for 
individual firms and farms declines as the number of firms and farms rises.
Overall, we show that traceability enhances the market-based incentives of private 
firms to provide safer food.  Furthermore we demonstrate the incentives for marketing 
firms to encourage more traceability on the part of their raw material suppliers.  This 
result is consistent with reports from farmers that some marketing firms are encouraging 
or demanding enhanced traceability as a precondition for a supply relationship.  Our 20
results also suggest that, other thing constant, food safety will be higher with fewer firms 
in an industry because the firms internalize more of the costs imposed by food 
contamination problems.  These results also document a rational for collective action in 
industries with many firms to facilitate firms taking account of the benefits having a safer 
product has for the industry as a whole.   
Our general modeling approach is rich enough to accommodate investigation of 
several related topics that are not discussed thoroughly here.  Results concerning effects 
of enhanced traceability on industry output, market price and profit have been developed 
and are available in an appendix.  In addition, with some relaxation of assumptions made 
to simplify the exposition, we can explore how changes in the shape of cost function for 
traceability affect food safety.  By relaxing our assumption of identical firms, we can 
explore how differences in costs of providing traceability may provide strategic 
advantages for some firms as the demand for traceability changes.  For example, 
increases in perception of widespread food safety problems may benefit firms that can 
provide traceability more cheaply.  By indicating their willingness to accept liability for 
their products these firms may receive higher prices and enhance profits while supplying 
additional traceability and perhaps food safety.
Our model can also be adapted to explore the linkages between food safety 
regulation, mandatory traceability and enhanced demand for voluntary traceability and 
thus additional liability.  An important literature explores related topics in terms of 
product liability where there is a single step in the supply chain and traceability is not an 
issue.  Our ongoing work extends this literature to study the linkages from consumer tm 
marketer to raw material supplier when traceability is costly. 21
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